

1 Plaintiff Dunn submits this Sur-Reply in Opposition to Fitbit's Motion to Strike Class
 2 Allegations (Dkt. 129). A new material fact has emerged that directly affects Plaintiff's
 3 opposition arguments and calls into question the due process and fundamental fairness of the
 4 arbitration procedure that Fitbit is attempting to impose on the non-opt-out Plaintiffs.

5 For the last two years, Fitbit argued that because its Terms of Service incorporated a
 6 "delegation clause" only an arbitrator—and not this Court—could review the non-opt-out
 7 Plaintiffs' challenges to the applicability and enforceability of the arbitration clause and class
 8 action waiver. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 57 at 3 ("[T]he arbitrability of Plaintiffs' claims in this case must be
 9 decided by an arbitrator."); *id.* at 8 ("The Court should refer the parties to the AAA to decide
 10 whether the arbitration clause is to be enforced."); Dkt. 62 at 10 ("The Court should refer the
 11 parties to the AAA to decide whether the arbitration clause is to be enforced."); Dkt. 88 at 5
 12 ("[T]he parties agreed that arbitrability is for the arbitrator, not a court."); Dkt. 94 at 7 ("The
 13 parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated all issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The
 14 Court should refer the parties to the AAA to decide whether the arbitration clause is to be
 15 enforced"); Dkt. 118 at 3 ("[T]he arbitrator" must consider whether a "provision [that]
 16 purports to waive" a plaintiff's "right to seek public injunctive relief in all fora" renders the
 17 arbitration provision unenforceable) (citation omitted); Dkt. 134 at 3 ("The arbitrator must decide
 18 the arbitrability" of any claim brought by a non-opt out plaintiff). This Court agreed, holding that
 19 the non-opt-out Plaintiffs' arguments that "Fitbit procured the agreement to arbitrate by fraud"
 20 and that "the arbitration provision is unenforceable as applied to plaintiffs' claims for public
 21 injunctive relief . . . must be considered by the AAA arbitrator in the first instance," and that "the
 22 arbitrator will resolve [the non-opt-out] plaintiffs' challenges to the scope and enforceability of
 23 the arbitration clause." Dkt. 114 at 8-9 (emphasis added).

24 One non-opt-out Plaintiff, Kate McLellan, initiated an arbitration seeking a determination
 25 on precisely the arbitrability issues that the Court concluded must be determined by an arbitrator.
 26 *See* Dkt. 133 at 5; *id.*, Ex. A (noting that Ms. McLellan would "contest[] the scope and
 27 enforceability of the arbitration agreement"). If the arbitrator determines that the arbitration
 28 clause and class action waiver are not enforceable or applicable to the proposed class claims—an

1 issue that is identical for all non-opt-out Plaintiffs and unnamed class members—Fitbit’s motion
 2 to strike the class allegations will be moot.¹ Thus, Plaintiff Dunn argued in his opposition that,
 3 while the arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability is still pending, Fitbit’s motion was premature.

4 Now, in an about-face and a transparent effort to nullify Plaintiff Dunn’s “prematurity”
 5 argument, Fitbit has acted to deprive Ms. McLellan of *any opportunity* to resolve her arbitrability
 6 challenges in *any forum*, including in arbitration. After Ms. McLellan filed her arbitration
 7 demand, Fitbit made her a settlement offer. *See* Ex. A, Attachments 1-2. She declined the offer,
 8 explaining that, pursuant to this Court’s order, she intended to enforce her right to have an
 9 arbitrator determine “(1) whether the arbitration clause and class action waiver are enforceable
 10 and/or applicable to her claims, and (2) whether she can bring a claim for public injunctive relief
 11 on behalf of all members of the proposed class.” *Id.*, Attachment 3. Fitbit then informed the
 12 arbitrator that it “regard[ed] this matter as concluded” and refused to pay the arbitration fees as
 13 required under the Terms of Service, notwithstanding the fact that Ms. McLellan had properly
 14 initiated arbitration and rejected Fitbit’s settlement offer. *Id.* at 2. In other words, Fitbit is now
 15 refusing to engage in the arbitration it sought to compel for nearly two years.

16 Fitbit’s actions lay bare its strategy to use arbitration to deprive its consumers of even a
 17 modicum of due process. No authority permits a party to use a delegation clause to deny a party
 18 any opportunity to be heard. Yet this is exactly what Fitbit has done, and in so doing, it has
 19 undermined this Court’s order that the non-opt-out Plaintiffs’ arbitrability defenses “must be
 20 considered by the AAA arbitrator.” Dkt. 114 at 8.

21 This conduct further supports Plaintiff Dunn’s opposition to the motion to strike. It also
 22 constitutes a “new material fact” supporting a motion for reconsideration of the initial arbitration
 23 order. *See* Civ. L.R. 7-9. To avoid unnecessary filings with respect to the latter, however,
 24 Plaintiffs’ counsel will be prepared to address the matter with the Court at the upcoming hearing
 25 before taking further action.

26 ¹ In its Reply, Fitbit takes the illogical and impractical position that even if an arbitrator decides
 27 that the arbitration clause is unenforceable on grounds applicable to all, each of the potentially
 28 millions of consumers must obtain the same order in individual arbitration before they can
 become absent class members in Mr. Dunn’s proposed class action. Dkt. 134 at 4-5.

1 Respectfully submitted,

2 Dated: May 22, 2018 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on May 29, 2018, service of this document was accomplished pursuant to the Court's electronic filing procedures by filing this document through the ECF system.

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